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EXHIBITS LIST 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS: 
There was no hearing, so no reporter's transcript was taken. 
Exhibits: 
No exhibits were offered. The parties submitted briefs for consideration. 
Additional Documents: 
1. Claimant's Opening Brief, filed February 23, 2015 
2. Defendant Employer/Surety's Responsive Brief, filed March 25, 2015 
3. Claimant's Reply Brief, filed March 30, 2015 
4. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Recommendation, authored and signed by Referee 
Brian Harper on April 1, 2015, but not adopted by the Commission 
EXHIBITS LIST - KEITH MA YER 43468 - i 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: lNDUST COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT 12-004576 
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME Af..1D ADDRESS 
Keith Mayer ( deceased) 
524 11th Street 
Clarkston, Washington 99403 
TELEPHONE :NUMBER: (509) 758-9374 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS (at time of injury) 
TPC Holdings, Inc. 
505 Capital Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
CLAIMANT'S  SECURITY NO. 
 
CLAJMANT'S  
 
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
State of Idaho, County of Nez Perce 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED) 
CLAJMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 
Michael Kessinger 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone Number: 208.743.2313 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp. 
PO Box 7507 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
02-10-2012 
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE V/EEKLY WAGE 
OF: $ 349.44 , PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419 
Claimant caught a falling 20-foot ladder and fell to the ground, experiencing immediate low back pain. 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
Low back injury. 
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME? 
Claimant passed away of conditions unrelated to his workers' compensation injury. Claimant's spouse, Shirley Mayer, is entitled to disability in excess of impairment 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: [&] ORAL D WRITTEN D OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED 
1. Entitlement to disability in excess of impainnent; 
2. Entitlement to attorney fees for an unreasonable denial of benefits. 
'~""" 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? 0 YES [&] NO IF §0,-PLEASE STATE ViHY: 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE Il~ ACCORDANCE WITH 
IDAHO CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM J.C. 1002 
ICJOOJ (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Complaint - Page 1 of 3 
'SICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME AND 
,ey Medical Center; 2315 8"' Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
.. Joseph Regional Medical Center, PO Box 816, Lewiston, Idal10 83501 
John M. McNulty, MD, 229 South 7"' Street, St. Maries, ldal10 83861 
Peak Performance Physical Therapy, 1010 Bryden Ave, Ste. A, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Kootenai Neurology Clinic, 2022 Government Way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Tri-State Memorial Hospital, 1221 Highland Avenue, Clarkston, Washington 99403 
Clearwater Chiropractic, 3316 Y:, 4"' Street, Suite 4A, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Lewiston Orthopaedic Associates, 320 Warner Drive, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Clearwater Medical Clinic, 1522 17"' Street, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE? 
To be ascertained 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $ Unknown WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?$ Unknown . 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. [8J YES 
DATE 
/ l SIGNATURE OF CLAJMANT OR ATTORNEY ,e 
-----·-
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS :MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY DATE OF DEATH RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT 
FILING COMPLAINT 
WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED? I DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? 
DYES DNo DYES ONO 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
D NO 
I hereby certify that on the 2 7 ~ay --"---'"""""<-¥-----' 2ofl I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
TPC Holdings, Inc. 
505 Capital Street 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
via: personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
via: 
SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp. 
PO Box 7507 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form J.C. 1003 with 
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid 
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may he entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000. 
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0041 
Patient Nam Ke.Alii Ma yeJr> 
 
Address: B2H 5-tarfSizJn b)ft 1tl:I03 
Phone Number: ~c>_~-p::_-~q,_:_-,Y' ' 
 or Case Number: 
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number:---------
o Pick up Copies o Fax Copies# __ 
o Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by: 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEAL TH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize------------ to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To:---------------------,--,----------------
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator! Self Insured Employer!/SIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Purpose or need for data:-------------------------
(E.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care:-------
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Discharge Summary 
History & Physical Exam 
Consultation Reports 
Operative Reports 
Lab 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Pathology 
Radiology Reports 
Radiology Films 
Entire Record 
Other: Specify ______________________ _ 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable). 
D AIDS or HIV 
D Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
D Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and 
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I 
understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking 
the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider 
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise 
revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, 
officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of 
the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My 
signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding 
disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above. 
r/(L;ff;z. m~ 
Signature of Patient ~ 
Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
Signature of Witness Date 
Original: Medical Record Copy: Patient Complaint - Page 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, 700 S.CLEARWATER LN, BOISE, IDAHO 83712 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
I. C. NO. 2012-004576 ALLEGED INJURY DATE: February 10, 2012 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Mr. Keith Mayer Mr. Michael T. Kessinger Esq. 
524 11th Street Goicoechea Law Offices 
Clarkston, WA 99403 PO Box287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADORES WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME 
AND ADDRESS 
TPC Holdings, Inc. Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp. 
P.O. Box 957 P. 0. Box 7507 
Lewiston, ID 83501 Boise, Idaho 83707 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME 
ADDRESS) AND ADDRESS) 
Lea L. Kear 
Law Offices of Kent W. Day 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 ,, 
_X_ The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint b}''tfniting: 
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating;::: ~ .. _/ 
IT IS: {Check One) 
Admitted Denied 
X 1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint acfually OCS):lffed on or about the time 
claimed. 
X 2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
X 3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
X 4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly_ entirely_ by an accident arising out 
of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
NA NA 5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the 
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar to the 
trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
X 6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the 
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation 
of such occupational disease. 
NA NA 7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five months after 
the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted. 
X 8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho 
Code, Section 72-419: $ 436.80 
X 9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
10. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? NONE 
I 
IC1003 Answer~-Page 1 of 2 
(Continued from front 
11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses. 
A. Defendants deny all allegations of the Complaint not admitted herein. 
B. Whether Claimant's alleged injury is a result of an accident and injury pursuant to Idaho Code §72-102. 
C. Whether Claimant's current condition is causally related to the 2/10/12 alleged accident or is a pre-existing or subsequent condition 
D. Whether Claimant is entitled to (ADDITIONAL) indemnity benefits; 
E. Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees. 
F. Whether Claimant's claim should be retained by the Commission beyond the statute of limitations. 
G. Defendants reserve the right to amend this Answer since discovery in this matter has only just begun. 
Under the Commission rules, you have twenty=one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the 
Complaint. A copy of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their 
attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately 
the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All 
compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a 
Complaint has been filed. Rule lll(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation 
Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I.C. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. 
--
YES 
--
NO 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
No 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Dated Signature of Defendant or Attorney 
PPD 
$ 19,086.37 (PP!) 
PLEASE COMPLETE 
I hereby certify that on the 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY: 
Mr. Michael T. Kessinger Esq. 
Goicoechea Law Offices 
PO Box287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
via: personal service of process 
regular U.S. Mail 
TTD Medical 
-;:::7 I $20,862.07 (TTD) $ 31,315.92 $ 585.32 (TPD) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
of June, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
Frorn:Liberty Mutual lnsu ranc 01/ ~015 11:42 #406 P.005/007 
From:Llba,r-ty Mutual tnsunance 
Lea L. Kear (lSB 9357) 
Law Offices of Kent W. Day 
P.O. Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Telephone (208) 895-2580 
Fax (800) 972-3213 
Oi/16/2016 11:03 
Employees of the Liberty Mutual Group 
Keith Mayer, 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Claimant, 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
) LC. No. 2012-004576 
) 
) 
#029 P.003/005 
VS. 
) STIPULATED FACTS FOR HEARING 
) 
TPC Holdings, Inc., 
Employer, 
and 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp, 
Surety, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
} 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) _________ __:_.; .;._'---------
The parties agree to stipulate to the following facts: 
1. On February 1 O, 2012 Claimant Keith Mayer (hereafter Claimant) was an 
employee of TPC Holdings Inc. (hereafter Employer) in Lewiston, Idaho. At said 
time, TPC Holdings Inc. was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Worker's 
Compensation Act by Liberty Northwes1 Insurance Corp. (hereafter Surety). 
2. On or about February 10, 2012 Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject to 
provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
3. Claimant suffered a compensable worker's compensation injury when he 
strained his back while lifting a computer monitor. Earlier the same day, he 
1 - STIPULATED FACTS 
0 20 THU 
Fr<=>m:Llberty Mutual lnsu ranc 01/2 015 11:42 #406 P.006/007 
Frorn-:Ltb'Qrty Mutu0I lns.urmnca 
01/16/2016 11:04 #02!.I P.004/005 
grabbed a ladder to prevent it from fa!ling through a window and felt a twisting in 
his back. Both events occurred in the course and scope of Claimant's 
employment with Employer on February 10, 2012. Employer is the Lewiston 
Tribune where Claimant worked as a maintenance worker. 
4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury 
to his back. 
5. On August 27, 2012 Dr. Dietrich performed a lumbar decompression and 
decompression of the central canal lateral recess at neural foramina at l3, L4, 
LS, and S1. 
6. On November 8, 2012 Employer discharged Claimant. 
7. Dr. Dietrich deemed Claimant MMI as of September 1, 2013. 
8. On October 28, 2013 Dr. Goler performed an IME at surety's request. Dr. Galer 
believed Claimant was medically stabre and could return to full time work at 
least at the light or sedentary level with frequent positional changes and no 
lifting over 50 pounds. Dr. Goler gave Claimant a 9% WPI. 
9. On December 18, 2013 Dr. McNulty performed an IME at Claimant's request. 
He diagnosed Claimant with: chronic low back pain status post multi-level 
lumbar decompression; residual left S 1 radiculopathy; and spinal instability at 
L5-S 1. Dr. McNulty recommended further diagnostic testing. Dr. McNulty 
assigned a 14% WPI all attributable to the industrial injury. Dr. McNulty opined 
that Claimant was only capable of performing sedentary work on a part-time 
basis with no repetitive lifting and stooping and frequent positional changes. Dr. 
McNulty did not believe Claimant could return to his time of Injury job. 
2 - STIPULATED FACTS 
0 THU 1: NO 5934 
Frorn:Llberty Mutual lnsura.nc 01/2 _015 11:42 #406 P_OQ?/007 
Fro m:LibEH" ty Mutual tnsurano e 
01/16/20i5 i1:04 #029 P _006/005 
1 o. Dr. Dietrich concurred by letter with Dr. McNulty's IME. 
11.0n March 15, 2014 Ciaimant died of a heart attack, unrelated to the industrial 
injury. Claimant was  on He was 65 years ofd at the time 
of his death. 
12. Surety averaged the impairment awards given by Dr. McNulty and Dr. Golar. 
Surety continued paying PPI after Claimant's death until the award of 
$19,086.37 was paid in full. This award is equal to 52.5 weeks of benefits at 
$363.55 per week. 
r ~-------~-1 2ots 
DATED this ~/
5 dayofeetoo~ 
3- STIPULATED FACTS 
Law Offices of Kent W. Day 
Lea L. Kear 
Attorney for Defendants 
Michael Kessinger 
Attorney for Claimant 
O THU 11:5 5934] 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEITH MA YER, 
Claimant, 
V. 
TPC HOLDINGS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2012-004576 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
AND ORDER AND DISSENTING 
OPINION 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled 
matter to Referee Brian Harper. In lieu of hearing, the parties submitted the issue for resolution 
on a stipulation of facts and briefing. Claimant is represented by Michael Kessinger, Esquire, of 
Lewiston. Defendants are represented by Lea Kear, Esquire, of Boise. The matter came under 
advisement on March 31, 2015. Referee Harper submitted proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusion of Law and Recommendation for review and approval by the Commission pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 72-506(2). This case raises an issue which, at first blush, promises to yield to 
the clear language of an applicable statute. However, like many good problems, the closer one 
looks at it, the less it seems to admit a simple answer. 
In his proposed Decision, Referee Harper intimated that if unconstrained by pnor 
decisions of the Commission, he might be persuaded by the arguments raised by Defendants in 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 1 
support of their interpretation of the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-431. However, Referee 
Harper recognized that Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), is directly on point 
and compels the conclusion that disability less than total which was unspecified and unknown at 
the time of claimant's death survives the claimant's death from other causes. Accordingly, 
Referee Harper made a recommendation to the Commission which is consistent with the 
Commission's historic treatment of the issue in Martin. We agree with Referee Harper that the 
issues raised by Defendants are interesting and worthy of further discussion, all with a view 
towards ascertaining whether Martin was correctly decided. Therefore, we have chosen not to 
adopt Referee Harper's recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and 
Recommendation, even though we ultimately come to the same conclusion concerning the 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-4 31. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue to be decided is whether permanent partial disability in excess of 
permanent partial impairment (PPI) survives the death of Claimant when such death is 
unrelated to the industrial injury and Claimant dies before the existence and/or extent of 
such disability is determined, but after Claimant reached maximum medical improvement 
(MMI) and was assigned a PPI rating. 
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED 
The record in this matter consists of the Stipulation of Facts and legal briefing 
supplied by the parties. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. On February 10, 2012, Claimant suffered a compensable industrial accident. 
Following treatment, Claimant was declared medically stable as of September 1, 2013. On 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 2 
October 28, 2013, Dr. Goler performed an IME at Surety's request. He gave Claimant a 9% PPI 
rating. 
2. On December 18, 2013, Dr. McNulty performed an IME at Claimant's request. 
He eventually assigned Claimant a 14% PPI rating. Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Dietrich, 
concurred with Dr. McNulty' s 14% PPI rating. Surety averaged the impairment awards given by 
Dr. McNulty and Dr. Goler and commenced payment at the statutory rate. 
3. On March 15, 2014, Claimant died from causes unrelated to the subject accident. 
4. Following Claimant's death, Surety continued to pay PPI benefits until the full 
averaged rating, equaling $19,086.37, was paid. This award equates to 52.5 weeks of benefits at 
$363.55 per week, or 55% of the average state wage at Claimant's year of injury. 
DISCUSSION 
I 
5. The parties evidently concede that should Claimant be found to be totally and 
permanently disabled as a consequence of the subject accident, Surety's obligation to pay such 
total and permanent disability benefits ends with Claimant's death, and such benefits are in no 
wise inheritable. The issue before the Commission is whether, under Idaho Code § 72-431, a 
similar rule obtains in the event that Claimant is found to be less than totally and permanently 
disabled as a result of the subject accident. Claimant contends that the provisions of Idaho Code 
§ 72-431 clearly anticipate that an award of permanent disability less than total, made either 
before or after Claimant's death, is inheritable, while Defendants contend that the survival of 
both permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits are barred by the provisions of the 
statute. 
Idaho Code § 72-431 provides: 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 3 
When an employee who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or 
unscheduled permanent disability less than total, and who has filed a valid claim 
in his lifetime, dies from causes other than the injury or occupational disease 
before the expiration of the compensable period specified, the income benefits 
specified and unpaid at the employee's death, whether or not accrued or due at the 
time of his death, shall be paid, under an award made before or after such death, 
to and for the benefit of the persons within the classes at the time of death and in 
the proportions and upon the conditions specified in this subsection and in the 
order named: 
(1) To the dependent widow or widower, if there is no child under the age of 
eighteen (18) or child incapable of self-support; or 
(2) If there are both such a widow or widower and such a child or children, 
one-half (1/2) to such widow or widower and the other one-half (1/2) to such 
child or children; or 
(3) lfthere is no widow or widower but such a child or children, then to such 
child or children; or 
(4) If there is no survivor in the above classes, then to the personal 
representative of the decedent. 
The statute is a product of the comprehensive 1971 recodification of the Idaho workers' 
compensation laws, and has no antecedent in the prior statutory scheme. It seems 
straightforward enough, specifying that if an injured worker dies from causes unrelated to his 
accident or occupational disease, his survivors will be able to recover disability benefits payable 
to claimant if he is deemed to be less than totally and permanently disabled. Implicitly, this rule 
does not apply where claimant is found to be totally and permanently disabled. This is exactly 
the interpretation applied by the Commission in Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 
(1988). In Martin, claimant suffered a compensable work-related injury. At some point 
following her injury, she was given a PPI rating by a physician. However, the parties never 
came to agreement concerning the extent of Martin's entitlement to a PPI award prior to her 
death from an unrelated cause. Nor was there any agreement between the parties as to the extent 
and degree of Martin's disability in excess of physical impairment prior to her death. The issue 
before the Commission was whether Martin's claim for permanent partial disability benefits 
survived her death. Defendants did not argue that a claim for disability over impairment is 
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generally barred by the statute. Rather, they argued that since Martin's claim for permanent 
partial disability had not been adjudicated at the time of her death and no award had been 
entered, the claim was "unspecified" as that term is used in the statute. Rejecting this argument, 
and concluding that the claim for permanent partial disability benefits survived Martin, the 
Commission stated: 
The extent of a claimant's permanent partial disability is never finally determined 
until there is an award of the Commission following an evidentiary hearing or 
unless the parties have reached an agreement with regard to such permanent 
partial disability, reduced the agreement to writing and had the agreement 
approved by the Commission. Such approved agreement also constitutes an 
award of the Commission. We note that Sec. 72-431 specifically empowers the 
Commission to make an award both before and after the death of the claimant. 
We therefore conclude that 72-431 does not require that the extent of a claimant's 
permanent partial disability be specified by an award prior to the death of the 
claimant in order for the income benefits to survive the death of the claimant and 
be distributed to survivors. The reference in the statute to "the income benefits 
specified and unpaid at the employee's death" does not necessarily require that 
the benefits be specified by award prior to the death of the claimant. The 
Commission, may following the death of the claimant, conduct an evidentiary 
hearing and make an award and therein specify the income benefits due for 
permanent partial disability which were unpaid at the employee's death, and in 
the award distribute such benefits as may be determined to the named survivors. 
We therefore conclude that all permanent partial disability benefits, including 
disability from medical impairment as well as nonmedical factors, may be 
determined by the Commission subsequent to the death of the employee from 
unrelated causes and may then be awarded by the Commission to the classes 
specified in Section 72-431. 
Therefore, a claim for permanent partial disability benefits survives the claimant's death even 
though claimant's entitlement to such an award was not adjudicated prior to death. 
6. Martin seems to make it clear that the fact that Claimant's entitlement to 
disability less than total was not adjudicated or otherwise resolved prior to his death is not an 
impediment to the survival of a claim for disability less than total. Martin did not specifically 
address the somewhat different issue before the Commission in this case, i.e. whether claims for 
permanent partial disability as well as claims for total and permanent disability are barred by the 
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provisions of Idaho Code § 72-431. Again, a cursory reading of the statute seems to indicate that 
if permanent disability is less than total, then it has the potential to survive the death of the 
injured worker while disability that is total and permanent does not. 
7. In addition to adopting Idaho Code § 72-431 as part of the 1971 recodification, 
the legislature also adopted, for the first time, definitions of impairment and disability. 
Permanent impairment is defined at Idaho Code § 72-422 as follows: 
"Permanent impairment" is any anatomic or functional abnormality or loss after 
maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which abnormality or loss, 
medically, is considered stable or nonprogressive at the time of evaluation. 
Permanent impairment is a basic consideration in the evaluation of permanent 
disability, and is a contributing factor to, but not necessarily an indication of, the 
entire extent of permanent disability. 
Permanent disability is defined at Idaho Code§ 72-423 as follows: 
"Permanent disability" or "under a permanent disability' results when the actual 
or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of 
permanent impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be 
reasonably expected. 
Under Idaho Code § 72-424, the evaluation of permanent impairment envisions a "medical 
appraisal of the nature and extent of the injury or disease as it affects an injured employee's 
personal efficiency in the activities of daily living ... ". Under Idaho Code § 72-425, permanent 
disability is evaluated by considering "the injured employee's present and probable future ability 
to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by the medical factor of permanent impairment and 
by pertinent nonrnedical factors as provided in Section 72-430, Idaho Code." Case law 
construing these sections makes it clear that an injured worker's permanent impairment is but 
one component to be considered by the Commission in assessing such worker's permanent 
disability; a disability rating may exceed the claimant's impairment rating. Baldner v. Bennett's, 
Inc., 103 Idaho 458, 649 P.2 1214 (1982). So far, the statutory scheme seems to recognize a 
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distinction between the concepts of permanent impairment and permanent disability. If these 
statutory definitions of impairment and disability are applied to the provisions of Idaho Code 
§ 72-4 31, it is easy to appreciate why the statute can be interpreted to mean that an award of less 
than total and permanent disability does survive the death of the injured worker while an award 
of total and permanent disability does not. The statute specifically states that the income benefits 
owed to "an employee who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or unscheduled 
permanent disability less than total" shall be payable to the injured worker's survivors. If 
"disability" is a term of art, then it seems clear that what was intended is that permanent partial 
disability benefits are inheritable while total and permanent disability benefits are not. 
8. However, though portions of the statutory scheme draw distinctions between what 
is meant by "impairment" and "disability", in other portions there is an unfortunate intermingling 
of the terms which confuses the resolution of the issue before the Commission. To begin, what 
exactly is meant by this language from Idaho Code § 72-431; "When an employee who has 
sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or unscheduled permanent disability less than 
total ... "? If, as Claimant argues, the purpose of the statute is to make permanent partial 
disability inheritable, but not total and permanent disability, why doesn't the statute simply say, 
"When an employee who has sustained disability less than total ... "? What is this business about 
"scheduled and unscheduled permanent disability less than total ... "? 
9. To understand what is meant by "scheduled and unscheduled disabilities less than 
total", reference must be made to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code 
§ 72-429. 
10. Idaho Code § 72-428 provides for the payment of certain scheduled benefits for 
total and partial losses of members of the body. The statute specifies in pertinent part: 
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An employee who suffers a permanent disability less than total and permanent 
shall, in addition to the income benefits payable during the period of recovery, be 
paid income benefits for such permanent disability in an amount equal to fifty-
five percent (55%) of the average weekly state wage stated against the following 
scheduled permanent impairments respectively: 
There follows a specific indemnity schedule for total losses of body parts, and the number of 
weekly payments to be made as specific indemnity for such loss. Idaho Code § 72-428(5) 
recognizes that the injury to a specific body part may result in a partial as well as a total loss. 
That subsection provides: 
Partial loss or partial loss of use. Income benefits payable for permanent partial 
disability attributable to permanent partial loss or loss of use, of a member shall 
be not less than for a period as the permanent impairment attributable to the 
partial loss or loss of use of the member bears to total loss of the member. 
Therefore, for the partial loss of a body part, the injured worker shall be paid a sum based on the 
relationship the partial loss of the body part bears to the total loss of the body part. 
11. There are several things that are notable about the provisions of Idaho Code § 
72-428. First, the specific indemnities recognized in that section are payable only in cases of 
disability less than total; a totally and permanently disabled worker is not entitled to the 
payments specified in this section. Second, the benefits payable pursuant to Idaho Code § 
72-428 are payable in addition to whatever income benefits the injured worker was entitled to 
while in a period of recovery. In other words, the payment of Idaho Code § 72-428 benefits 
arises independent of any temporary disability from work. Third, the benefits payable pursuant 
to the statute, though characterized as payments for "permanent disability" are to be paid in an 
amount equal to 55% of the average weekly state wage stated against the "schedule of permanent 
impairments" listed in the body of the statute. Therefore, the specific indemnities identified for 
partial and total loss of body parts represent benefits for what can only be characterized as 
"permanent impairments". In short, what is clearly anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-428 is that if 
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an injured worker is less than totally and permanently disabled, he is entitled to receive the 
payment of permanent impairment for total or partial loss of the body parts referenced in the 
statute. It is unclear why the statute specifies income benefits paid pursuant to the statute are for 
"permanent disability" when the payments are intended for what can only be described as 
"permanent impairment". 
12. Of course, Idaho Code § 72-428 does not capture the umverse of potential 
permanent impairments that might befall an injured worker. Unscheduled permanent disabilities 
not included in the schedule of benefits enumerated in Idaho Code § 72-428 are dealt with in 
Idaho Code§ 72-429. That section provides: 
In all other cases of permanent disabilities less than total not included in the 
foregoing schedule the amount of income benefits shall be not less than the 
evaluation in relation to the percentages of loss of the members, or of loss of the 
whole man, stated against the scheduled permanent impairments, as the 
disabilities bear to those produced by the permanent impairments named in the 
schedule. Weekly income benefits paid pursuant to this section shall likewise be 
paid at fifty-five percent (55%) of the average weekly state wage for the year of 
the injury as provided in section 72-428, Idaho Code. 
The statute, particularly the first run-on sentence, is hardly a model of clarity, and has left at least 
one commentator scratching his head about what exactly the legislature intended. See MIKE 
WETHERELL, THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION LAW OF IDAHO 277 (4th ed. 1989). As with Idaho 
Code § 72-428, the statute is only intended to apply in less than total cases and is also clearly 
intended to treat those "disabilities" which are not included in the schedule of specific indemnity 
contained therein. In such cases, the income benefits payable to the injured worker for such 
"permanent disabilities" shall be "not less than the evaluation in relation to the percentages of 
loss of the members, or loss of the whole man, stated against the scheduled permanent 
impairments, as disabilities bear to those produced by the permanent impairments named in the 
schedule." It is difficult to understand what is intended by this language. It may mean that the 
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amount payable for an unscheduled impairment shall bear the same relation to the amount 
payable for a scheduled impairment as the severity of the unscheduled injury bears to the 
severity of a scheduled injury. It may mean something else. Possibly, it has something to do 
with how "permanent disability," as defined at Idaho Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code § 72-430 is 
to be calculated and paid. Possibly, it is only concerned with the calculation of what we 
typically think of as unscheduled "permanent impairment" as defined by Idaho Code § 72-422. 
13. It is important to understand whether Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code 
§ 72-429 deal only with the payment of "permanent impairment" versus "permanent 
impairment" and "permanent disability", because of the language of Idaho Code § 72-431: 
"When an employee who has sustained a disability compensable as a scheduled or unscheduled 
permanent disability less than total ... ". If Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429 are 
intended only to specify the manner in which awards of permanent impairment are made, then 
Idaho Code § 72-431 would only seem to endorse the proposition that entitlement to PPI benefits 
(which are only payable in less than total cases) survive the death of the injured worker, 
notwithstanding that the statute refers to scheduled or unscheduled "permanent disability". Said 
slightly differently, it is clear that Idaho Code § 72-431 references scheduled and unscheduled 
benefits to which a claimant may be entitled under Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code 
§ 72-429. If those statutes only treat the award of permanent impairment, despite the fact that 
those statutes freely use the term "disability", then it would seem that Idaho Code § 72-431 was 
only intended to treat the survival of what we conventionally refer to as a PPI award. 
14. Although Idaho Code § 72-431 has no antecedent in prior law, the current Idaho 
Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code§ 72-429 do have antecedents in the prior statutory scheme, and a 
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review of prior Idaho Supreme Court cases treating those earlier statutes may shed some light on 
the legislative intent in adopting Idaho Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429. 
15. Prior to the 1971 recodi:fication, the concepts captured in the current Idaho Code 
§ 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429 were captured in one statute, the former Idaho Code 
§ 72-313. There were a number of iterations of that statute over the years, but immediately prior 
to the 1971 recodi:fication, it read as follows: 
SPECIFIC INDEMNITIES FOR CERTAIN INJURIES. (a) Specific Indemnity 
for Permanent Injury. An employee, who suffers a permanent injury less that 
total, shall, in addition to compensation, if any, for temporary total and temporary 
partial disability, be entitled to specific indemnity for such permanent injury equal 
to 60% of his average weekly wages, but not more than $43.00 nor less than 
$26.00 per week for the periods of time stated against the following scheduled 
injuries respectively: 
SPECIFIC INDEMNITY SCHEDULE 
For loss of one: 
For the following 
Number of weeks: 
Arn1 at or near shoulder ..................................................................................... 240 
At elbow ....................................................................................................... 220 
Between wrist and elbow ............................................................................. 210 
Hand ............................................................................................................. 200 
Thumb and Metacarpal bone thereof ................................................................... 70 
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 40 
At second or distal joint ................................................................................. 30 
Index finger and Metacarpal bone thereof ........................................................... 40 
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 35 
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 20 
At distal joint. ................................................................................................. 10 
Middle finger and metacarpal bone thereof.. ....................................................... 40 
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 30 
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 18 
At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 8 
Ring Finger and metacarpal bone thereof ............................................................ 30 
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 20 
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 10 
At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 5 
Little finger and metacarpal bone thereof ............................................................ 20 
At proximal joint ............................................................................................ 15 
At middle joint ............................................................................................... 10 
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At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 5 
Leg at or so near hip joint as to preclude use of artificial limb ......................... 180 
At or above knee where stump remains sufficient to permit use of 
artificial limb ................................................................................................ 150 
Between knee and ankle ............................................................................... 140 
Foot at ankle ................................................................................................. 125 
Great toe with metatarsal bone thereof. ............................................................... 30 
At proximal joint. ........................................................................................... 15 
At second or distal joint ................................................................................. 10 
Toe other than great toe with metatarsal bone thereof.. ....................................... 12 
At proximal joint. ............................................................................................. 6 
At second joint ................................................................................................. 3 
At distal joint. ................................................................................................... 3 
Eye by enucleation ............................................................................................. 140 
Total blindness of one eye ........................................................................... 120 
Ear, total deafness of one ..................................................................................... 35 
Total deafness of second ear ........................................................................ 115 
(b) Computation of Specific Indemnity for Non-scheduled Injuries. In all other 
cases of permanent injury, less than total, not included in the above schedule, the 
compensation shall bear such relation to the periods stated in the above schedule 
as the disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries named in the schedule or 
to total disability (400 weeks). 
(c) Specific Indemnity. -Computation of Minor's Wages. In case of a minor, 
under 18 years of age, receiving less weekly wages than paid to regular adult 
workmen employed in the same community or vicinity in the class of labor in 
which such minor was employed, the compensation provided for under this 
section shall be computed upon the basis of the wages received by such regular 
adult workmen. 
Idaho Code § 72-313. (1967). 
Comparing this provision to the current statutory scheme reveals that the former Idaho Code 
§ 72-313(a) bears a strong resemblance to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428, while Idaho 
Code § 72-313(b) similarly resembles the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-429. Basically, the 
former Idaho Code § 72-313(b) anticipates that the compensation payable for unscheduled 
injuries shall bear the same relationship to the compensation payable for scheduled injuries as the 
severity of the unscheduled injury bears to the severity of the scheduled injuries. This language 
demonstrates that what was being treated in the fom1er Idaho Code§ 72-313(b) was payment of 
indemnity for bodily injury, i.e., what we would now call "permanent impairment". 
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16. At the time Idaho Code § 72-313 was in effect, the statutory scheme did not 
contain a provision similar to Idaho Code § 72-431. However, the issue of the inheritability of 
workers' compensation benefits was treated by the Court on several occasions over the decades, 
and Idaho Code§ 72-313 figures prominently in the treatment of that issue. As developed infra, 
those cases strongly suggest that under the former, but similar, statute, only what we now call 
"permanent impairment" was intended to be inheritable by an injured worker's survivors. 
17. In Haugse v. Sommers Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 Idaho 450, 254 P. 212 (1927), Haugse 
suffered the loss of an eye as the result of a work-related accident. The workers' compensation 
surety entered into an agreement with Haugse to pay him $1,920, at the rate at $16.00 per week 
for 120 weeks as compensation for loss of the eye. This agreement was approved by the 
Industrial Commission, and payments were made thereon by surety until Haugse died from 
causes unrelated to the subject accident. Thereafter, surety asked that it be relieved from the 
obligation to pay the balance of the award. Surety appealed from an order of the district court 
requiring it to continue the payments. On appeal, surety argued that it is a policy of workers' 
compensation that injured workers receive benefits only during periods of incapacity for work, 
and that on termination of such incapacity ( e.g., death), compensation should cease. The Court 
ruled, however, that these general principles did not apply to the specific injuries suffered by 
claimant. The applicable statute provided: 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be fifty-five per 
centum of the average weekly wages, but not more than the weekly compensation 
provided in section 6231, in addition to all other compensation, for the periods 
stated against such injuries respectively, to wit: * * * One eye by enucleation, 120 
[weeks]. * * *" 
Therefore, unlike other workers' compensation benefits, the requirement to pay a scheduled 
benefit for the loss of an eye was unconditional, and required in addition to all other 
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compensation. Distinguishing between such a scheduled benefit, and other workers' 
compensation benefits, the Court stated: 
There is nothing in C. S. § 6234, or in the entire act, providing for a cessation of 
payments, for the loss of an eye by enucleation, on the death of the injured person. 
By its approval of the agreement the board awarded the workman $1,920. The 
award was in accordance with the statute, and was unconditional; it was not made 
to depend on a continuation of incapacity, or whether the workman lived 
throughout the life of the agreement; and the casualty company was not released 
from its obligation by the death of the injured workman. 
The scheduled benefits payable for the loss of an eye did not depend on Haugse's incapacity 
from work. Therefore, surety was not released from its obligation by Haugse's death. 
18. In Mahoney v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P.2d 927 (1943), one Linder 
suffered bilateral upper extremity injuries as a consequence of a work-related accident. While 
still receiving treatment for his left upper extremity injuries Linder died from causes unrelated to 
the work accident. Surety contended that it did not have responsibility to continue paying the 
award following Linder's death. The Court disagreed, stating that the award to Linder was in the 
nature of liquidated damages and not compensation for disability which otherwise might cease 
with his death. As the Court explained: 
In other words, the award to survive must have been an award to the employee 
and the right thereto, though not determined, fixed at the time of the accident and 
before his death. If the award is not under the special schedule, the authorities 
almost uniformly hold it does not survive; therefore, the dependents could make 
no claim. 
Therefore, there is a distinction to be drawn between benefits payable under a "special schedule", 
and other workers' compensation benefits, such as compensation for disability. 
19. That such a distinction exists is made clear by Peterson v. JR. Simplot Co., 83 
Idaho 120, 358 P.2d 587 (1961). Peterson suffered a severe right upper extremity injury as the 
result of a work-related accident. He died from causes umelated to his work accident before he 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 14 
had reached stability from his work-related injuries. Therefore, the extent of Peterson's residual 
permanent injury attributable to the work accident had not been determined as of the date of his 
death. Surety petitioned the Commission for permission to close its file without payment of a 
specific indemnity for Peterson's injury. The Industrial Accident Board declined to do so, and 
instead retained jurisdiction to determine the extent and degree of Peterson's entitlement to 
recovery for a permanent injury. The employer appealed this order. The Court had before it the 
provisions of Idaho Code § 72-313, set forth above, noting that compensation for permanent 
injury less than total was governed by that statute. However, from the evidence it was clear that 
Peterson's injury did not fall within one of the specific scheduled injuries identified at Idaho 
Code § 72-313(a). Rather, Peterson's upper extremity injury constituted one of the 
"nonscheduled" injuries referenced at Idaho Code § 72-313(b ). The question before the Court 
was whether a claim for permanent partial disability survives the death of an injured employee if 
the death is unrelated to the industrial accident and if the claim is based on a nonscheduled 
injury. Citing Mahoney, supra, the Court first ruled that a claim for specific indemnity for 
permanent injury survives though the cause of the injured worker's death is unrelated to the 
industrial accident. 
20. Concerning indemnity for nonscheduled injuries, the Court noted that prior to 
193 7 there was no provision to pay indemnity benefits for injuries other than those identified in 
the specific indemnity schedule. However, in 193 7, the predecessor to Idaho Code § 72-313 was 
amended to provide a method of computation of specific indemnity for all permanent injuries 
less than total which are recognized as specific and comparable losses of the named body parts. 
Thereafter, all such losses, both scheduled and unscheduled, constituted permanent injuries 
within the purview of the specific indemnity schedule as set forth at Idaho Code § 72-313. This 
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strongly suggests that the immediate predecessor to the current Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho 
Code § 72-429 recognized that benefits payable for unscheduled indemnities were for permanent 
impairment and not permanent disability over and above impairment. This is reinforced by the 
following observation of the Court: 
Survivability of a claim for specific indemnity for permanent injury is grounded 
upon actual or comparable loss or physical impairment, and not upon loss of 
earning power or capacity to work. This aspect of the workmen's compensation 
law is recognized. 
From this language, it could not be any plainer that the provisions of the former Idaho Code 
§ 72-313 provided for the payment of scheduled and nonscheduled impairments, and that only 
such impairments (and not disability for loss of earning capacity) survive the death of an injured 
worker. 
21. Hix v. Potlatch Forest, Inc., 88 Idaho 155, 397 P.2d 237 (1964) is not a death 
case, but it does construe the former Idaho Code § 72-313. Hix suffered work-related injuries for 
which he was rated by a number of physicians. The Industrial Accident Board eventually 
averaged these ratings, awarding Hix 76.5% of the whole man (400 weeks), or 306 weeks of 
compensation at $30 per week. Hix did not quarrel with the 76.5% rating, but contended that it 
should have been paid to him against the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-31 O(a), which provided 
for the payment of benefits for total and permanent disability for work. Hix reasoned that if he 
had suffered total and permanent disability, he would have been entitled to the payment of 1,836 
weeks of benefits based on his life expectancy of 43 years. Hix argued that he should have been 
paid 76.5% of the benefits that he would have received for this period had he been found to be 
totally and permanently disabled. The Court rejected this argument, but also rejected the 
calculation utilized by the Commission to compensate claimant for his injury. Rather, the Court 
concluded that claimant's less than total disability could only be compensated under the 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
AND DISSENTING OPINION - 16 
provisions of Idaho Code § 72-313. The Court's treatment of Idaho Code § 72-313 makes it 
clear that the only benefits payable under that statute were for what we now describe as 
permanent impairment: 
This Court has considered the meaning and application of LC. § 72-313, which 
evaluates the various bodily members where actual loss is occasioned, such as an 
arm, leg, eye, etc. In other cases of permanent injury not included in the schedule 
compensation shall bear such relation to the amount stated in the schedule as the 
disabilities bear to those produced by the injuries stated in the schedule. This 
latter provision of LC. § 72-313, requiring nonscheduled permanent injuries to be 
evaluated by comparison to the listed permanent injuries, was effected in 193 7 by 
an amendment, Idaho Sess. Laws 193 7, ch. 241. Prior to that amendment, non-
scheduled permanent injuries, unless they could be included in the listed classes 
of permanent injuries, could not be evaluated in terms of comparative loss of 
bodily members, and no compensation could be allowed therefor. See Barry v. 
Peterson Motor Co., 55 Idaho 702, 46 P.2d 77 (1935), again indicative that 
recovery under the workmen's compensation law must be by virtue of legislative 
fiat, and not otherwise. 
In determining specific indemnities payable for permanent injuries listed and 
referred to in LC. § 72-313, disability for work, loss of earning power, or capacity 
to work are not factors to be considered. See Kelly v. Prouty, 54 Idaho 225, 245, 
30 P.2d 769, 777 (1934), wherein it is stated; 
'* * * The Compensation Law also provides for specific 
indemnities for certain injuries, as set forth in section 43-1113 
[now LC. § 72-313], when disability for work by reason of the loss 
of the various members of the body, enumerated is not to be taken 
in consideration. [Citation.] But the general theory and spirit of 
the act, except for the specific indemnities set forth in section 
43-1113, is to the effect that compensation is provided to make 
good the loss of the earning power or capacity to work on account 
of the injury. * * * in determining those specific indemnities, the 
loss of earning power or capacity to work is not to be considered. * 
* *' 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Hix went on to argue that even under the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-313, some provision 
should be made for the payment of disability above and beyond the specific indemnities 
identified in the statute. The Court rejected this argument, ruling that in cases of less than total 
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and permanent disability, claimant's entitlement to compensation must be evaluated under the 
specific loss or comparative loss of body parts referenced in Idaho Code § 72-313, and not 
otherwise. 
22. One other case is worth discussing before leaving the former Idaho Code 
§ 72-313. Estate of Martin v. Woods, 94 Idaho 870, 499 P.2d 569 (1972), though decided in 
June of 1972, involved interpretation of the former Idaho Code § 72-313. Martin received 
multiple injuries to his head, right upper extremity and torso as the result of an accident at a 
lumber mill. He was still receiving treatment for these severe injuries when he met his death on 
a hunting trip. Following proceedings on unrelated matters, Martin's widow petitioned the 
Industrial Accident Board, seeking an award of benefits based on specific indemnities for 
Martin's injuries and for an award of temporary total disability benefits and attorney's fees. 
23. The Board found that Martin's specific indemnities "combined to constitute a 
total and permanent disability." The Board concluded that Martin was totally and permanently 
disabled, and that such total and permanent disability did not survive to the estate. Only in the 
event of a specific indemnity loss or comparative rating based upon a specific indemnity loss less 
than total can such an indemnity survive the death of the injured worker. Martin's estate 
appealed. The Supreme Court identified the principal issue as follows: 
The underlying problem facing appellant in this appeal is the fact that this Court 
has held that claims for specific indemnity for permanent injuries survive the 
death of the claimant (Peterson's Estate v. J. R. Simplot Co., 83 Idaho 120, 358 
P.2d 587 (1961)), but there is no holding by this Court that benefits for total 
permanent disability survive the death of the injured workman. 
Martin Estate v. Woods, 94 Idaho 870, 874, 499 P.2d 569, 573 (1972). 
The Court ruled that it found no legislative authority for the proposition that claims for total and 
permanent disability survive the death of the employee. In reaching this conclusion, it relied, in 
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part, on Peterson's Estate v. JR. Simplot Co., supra. It cited that case for the proposition that 
while claims for specific indemnity for permanent injury survive the death of the injured worker, 
benefits payable for loss of earning power or capacity to work do not. Since an award of total 
and permanent disability is intended to compensate the injured worker for loss of earning power 
or capacity, such an award cannot, therefore, survive the death of the injured worker. 
24. What is left undiscussed in Martin is whether a claim for disability over and 
above impairment, but less than total, is likewise not inheritable. However, the rationale of the 
Court's decision limiting the survival of benefits to the specific indemnities identified in Idaho 
Code § 72-313 applies with equal weight to disability benefits payable to an injured worker over 
and above permanent impairment which are also intended to compensate him for loss of earning 
power and capacity in the less than total case. 
25. From a review of the former Idaho Code § 72-313 it can be concluded that it dealt 
with the payment of specific indemnities, both scheduled and unscheduled, for damage to, or loss 
of, parts of the body, i.e., what we would now treat as the payment of "permanent impairment". 
With this understanding of the former statute, the question becomes whether something other 
than the calculation of what is generally regarded as "permanent impairment" is contemplated by 
the provisions of the current Idaho Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code§ 72-429. 
26. Under Idaho Code § 72-428, an injured worker who has suffered anatomic loss 
recognized by that section shall be paid permanent disability less than total at 55% of the average 
weekly wage against the scheduled permanent impairments itemized in that section. Although 
the indemnity payable is clearly intended to compensate the injured worker for partial or total 
loss of use of a body member, the statute nevertheless characterizes these payments as payments 
for "permanent disability" less than total. It is puzzling and confusing that the statute 
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characterizes what we typically think of as the payment of "permanent impairment" as 
"permanent disability". We surmise that this is simply a recognition of the fact that permanent 
impairment is a component of permanent disability. Idaho Code § 72-422 provides in pertinent 
part: 
... Permanent impairment is a basic consideration in the evaluation of permanent 
disability, and is a contributing factor to, but not necessarily an indication of, the 
entire extent of permanent disability. 
27. Idaho Code§ 72-429 is more difficult to parse. Again, if the statute describes the 
method to compute both unscheduled "permanent impairment" and "permanent disability", i.e. 
disability over impairment but less than total, then Idaho Code § 72-431 must be construed to 
endorse the survival of claims for less than total disability over and above impairment, but not 
for total and permanent disability. On the other hand, if Idaho Code § 72-429 does nothing more 
than describe the method of computing the value which attaches to unscheduled anatomic injury, 
then PPI is the only benefit that survives the death of a worker from causes unconnected to the 
work accident. 
28. Comparing the former Idaho Code§ 72-313(b) to Idaho Code§ 72-429 reveals 
certain fundamental similarities. Both statutes address a method by which certain unscheduled 
indemnity benefits may be calculated by reference to the scheduled benefits identified at Idaho 
Code § 72-428. Although Idaho Code § 72-429 addresses the calculation of unscheduled 
"permanent disability" less than total while Idaho Code § 72-313(b) speaks to the calculation of 
unscheduled "permanent injury", both statutes use a similar formula to calculate the value of the 
unscheduled indemnity and both base that calculation on a comparison to the list of scheduled 
benefits for anatomic injury referenced at Idaho Code§ 72-428. To paraphrase, under the former 
Idaho Code § 72-313(b), for an unscheduled injury, the number of weeks of indemnity payable 
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for that injury is to the specific indemnities identified in the schedule as the severity of the 
unscheduled injury is to the severity of those identified in the schedule. The first sentence of 
Idaho Code § 72-429 seems to anticipate that for injuries not included in the Idaho Code 
§ 72-428 schedule, the percentage of loss for such injury is to the scheduled indemnities as the 
severity of the injury in question is to the severity of the scheduled impairments. Arguably, like 
Idaho Code § 72-313(b ), the current Idaho Code § 72-429 only addresses the calculation of what 
we generally understand to be unscheduled "permanent impairment". However, as developed 
above, we are mindful that as part of the 1971 recodification, Idaho adopted statutory provisions 
which define and distinguish the terms "permanent disability" and "permanent impairment". 
Since "permanent disability" is specifically defined at Idaho Code § 72-425 and Idaho Code 
§ 72-430, we believe that the use of this term in Idaho Code § 72-429 cannot be disregarded. 
Idaho Code § 72-422 recognizes that "permanent impairment" is a component of "permanent 
disability". For permanent disability less than total, Idaho Code § 72-428 recognizes that one of 
the components of permanent disability is payment for anatomic injury based on the schedule set 
forth in that statute. For all other "permanent disabilities" less than total, Idaho Code § 72-429 
specifies that the amount payable for such permanent disability shall be calculated as a 
percentage of the loss of a bodily member or the loss of the whole man in an amount that reflects 
the severity of the disability as compared to the scheduled impairments set forth at Idaho Code 
§ 72-428. It is also notable that Idaho Code § 72-429 specifies that the income benefits paid 
pursuant to that section shall "likewise" be paid at 55% of the average state weekly wage. 
Although the statute is difficult to dissect, we see nothing in the language of Idaho Code 
§ 72-429 which is inconsistent with the proposition that it is intended to speak not only to the 
payment of what we conventionally think of as unscheduled permanent impairment, but also to 
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what we conventionally think of as disability over and above impairment, less than total. 
Nowhere else in the statutory scheme does one find direction for the arithmetical calculation of 
disability. Only in Idaho Code § 72-429 does there exist the instruction that it be paid as a 
percentage of the whole person at 55% of the average state weekly wage. If Idaho Code 
§ 72-429 does not speak to the calculation of disability in excess of impairment, then the 
accepted convention for calculating and paying such disability is not to be found in the statutory 
scheme. 
29. Finally, although the Supreme Court's treatment of the provisions of Idaho Code 
§ 72-429 is scant, we nevertheless believe that the Court's decision in Carey v. Clearwater 
County Road Dept, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) necessarily lends some support to the 
proposition that Idaho Code § 72-429 provides for the award and calculation of disability over 
and above impairment. Carey, of course, is important for articulating the method by which 
disability must be apportioned between employer and the ISIF in a case of total and permanent 
disability. It also addresses the question of whether, in discharging its obligation to pay a 
proportionate share of claimant's total and permanent disability, employer's responsibility to pay 
is subject to the annual escalation provisions of Idaho Code § 72-408. In treating this issue, the 
Court had occasion to consider the provisions of the then applicable version of Idaho Code 
§ 72-429. The Court determined that the version of Idaho Code § 72-429 then in effect should 
not be construed to require defendants to pay their proportionate share of claimants' total and 
permanent disability subject to the annual escalator provisions of Idaho Code § 72-408. Implicit 
in the Court's treatment of this issue is a recognition that the 90% disability assigned to 
employer, inclusive of both impairment and disability in excess of impairment, was undertaken 
pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-429. Therefore, although the Court did not 
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address the specific issue before the Commission in this case, the court impliedly recognized that 
the payment of disability over and above impairment is contemplated by the provisions of the 
statute. 
30. While we acknowledge that the former Idaho Code § 72-313 appears to have 
treated only what we now describe by convention as the payment of permanent impairment, we 
conclude that Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429 contemplate the payment of both 
impairment and disability in excess of impairment, but less than total. While we concede that 
this is a close question, and that the statutes, particularly Idaho Code § 72-429, could be 
otherwise construed, we find additional support for the position that we adopt in the axiom that 
the workers' compensation laws of this state should be construed in a manner that favors the 
payment of compensation. See Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996). As 
developed below, once it is determined that the unscheduled disabilities less than total addressed 
by Idaho Code § 72-429 include disabilities over impairment, it follows that Idaho Code 
§ 72-431 does contemplate that disability over and above impairment, but less than total, is 
inheritable by the survivors of an injured worker who dies from non-work-related causes. 
Therefore, our construction of Idaho Code § 72-429 is consistent with the direction that the 
workers' compensation laws should be construed in a manner which favors the payment of 
compensation. 
31. As noted above, the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-431 have no antecedent in 
prior law. A history of the discussions, debates, conferences and legislative action leading to the 
comprehensive recodification of the workers' compensation laws in 1971 is sadly incomplete. 
However, it is known that model Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law (the Model 
Code) authored by the Council of State Governments figured in the deliberations of those 
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charged with considering how or whether to rework the statutory scheme. 1 Section 15 of the 
Model Code contains provisions relating to the payment of income benefits for disability. 
Subsection (a) treats the payment of total disability benefits, subsection (b) treats the payment of 
partial disability benefits, and subsection ( c) treats the payment of scheduled income benefits. 
Subsection ( c) makes provision for the payment of the kind of scheduled losses found in Idaho 
Code§ 72-428. These subsections provide in pertinent part: 
Section 15. Income Benefits for Disability. Income benefits for disability shall be 
paid to the employee as follows, subject to the maximum and minimum limits 
specified in Section 16. 
(a) Total Disability:For total disability, 55 per cent of his average weekly wage 
during such disability, and 2-1/2 per cent of his average weekly wage for each 
dependent, up to a maximum of five (5), specified in subsection (t) of Section 2, 
except a wife living apart from her husband for justifiable cause or by reason of 
his desertion unless such wife is actually dependent on the employee. (footnote 
omitted.) 
(b) Partial Disability: For partial disability, 55 per cent of his decrease in wage-
earning capacity during the continuance thereof, and 2-1/2 per cent of his average 
weekly wage for each dependent, up to a maximum of five (5), specified in 
subsection (t) of Section 2, except a wife living apart from her husband for 
justifiable cause or by reason of his desertion unless such wife is actually 
dependent on the employee. (footnote omitted.) 
(c) Scheduled Income Benefits: For total permanent bodily loss or losses 
herein scheduled, after and in addition to the income benefits payable during the 
period of recovery, scheduled income benefits in the amount of 5 5 per cent of the 
average weekly wage as follows: [there follows a list of scheduled indemnity for 
loss of body parts] .... 
Subsection (h) of Section 15 reads as follows: 
When an employee, who has sustained disability compensable under subsection 
( c ), and who has filed a valid claim in his lifetime, dies from causes other than the 
injury before the expiration of the compensable period specified, the income 
benefits specified and unpaid at the individual's death, whether or not accrued or 
due at his death, shall be paid, under an award made before or after such death, for 
the period specified in this subsection, to and for the benefit of the persons within 
1 See E.B. Smith, Policy Issues Raised by Proposed Adoption of the Plan of the Model Code as a Pattern for Idaho's 
Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease Compensation Laws (September 20, 1969) and E.B. Smith, 
Comparative Studies of the Model Code with Idaho's Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease 
Compensation Laws (date unknown). 
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the classes at the time of death and in the proportions and upon the conditions 
specified in this subsection and in the order named. 
(1) To the widow or wholly actually dependent widower, if there is no child under 
the age of 18 or incapable of self-support; or 
(2) If there are both such a widow or widower and such a child or children, one-
half to such widow or widower and the other half to such child or children; or 
(3) If there is no such widow or widower but such a child or children, then to such 
child or children; or 
(4) If there is no survivor in the above classes, then the parent or parents wholly or 
partly actually dependent for support upon the decedent, or to other wholly or 
partly actually dependent relatives listed in Section 17(a)(7) or to both, in such 
proportions as the Director may provide by regulation. 
Subsection (h) bears striking similarity to the current Idaho Code § 72-431 and makes it very 
clear that under the Model Code only the payment of what we would now understand to be 
permanent impairment survives the death of the injured worker. 
32. Of course, subsection (h) of the Model Code is not identical to the current Idaho 
Code § 72-431. Idaho Code § 72-431 does not address "subsection (G)" of the Model Code. 
Rather, it references "scheduled or unscheduled permanent disability less than total". This subtle 
difference has significant implications since it leads back to the foundational issue of what is 
intended by the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-428 and Idaho Code § 72-429. While it is 
interesting that the Model Code contemplated only the inheritability of what we conventionally 
think of as permanent impairment, the Model Code is not particularly helpful (in fact, it is not 
helpful at all) in determining whether disability over and above impairment, but less than total, is 
inheritable under Idaho law. To make this determination, we must understand the provisions of 
Idaho Code§ 72-428 and Idaho Code§ 72-429, and as developed above, we conclude that those 
statutes treat both the payment of "permanent impairment" and "permanent disability". 
Therefore, we conclude that under Idaho Code § 72-431, both permanent impairment and what 
we conventionally think of as disability over and above impairment, but less than total, survive 
the death of the injured worker from causes other than the work injury. 
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33. It is not lost on us that this interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-431 endorses the 
disparate treatment of the survivors of totally and permanently disabled workers and the 
survivors of those injured workers who are merely profoundly disabled at the time of death. We 
can think of no good reason that is consistent with the underlying principles of workers' 
compensation that would support this disparate treatment. We are also cognizant of how our 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-431 incentivizes the survivors of an injured worker to argue 
that the injured worker was profoundly, but not totally and permanently, disabled at the time of 
his death, when the injured worker, while alive, would be incentivized to argue that he is totally 
and permanently disabled. Similarly, employers are incentivized to argue for total and 
permanent disability of the deceased injured worker. Regardless, and despite the fact that 
alternate interpretations of Idaho Code § 72-429 can certainly be entertained, we continue to 
adhere to the implicit and explicit direction of Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist, 1988 IIC 0367 
(1988). Were we to decide that only "permanent impairment" survives the death of the injured 
worker from causes other than the work injury, this would have an impact not only on the 
families of such workers, but also on the class of all less than totally disabled workers, dead or 
alive. For example, employers entertaining settlement with a less than totally disabled employee 
would necessarily enjoy some additional leverage over the injured worker to obtain a more 
favorable (to the employer) settlement. The possibility that an injured worker might die from 
causes unrelated to the work accident during the period that disability would be paid lowers the 
settlement value of the claim for disability. For cases in which an award of less than total 
disability has been made by the Commission, sureties might be less willing to pay such awards in 
a lump sum for the same reason, at least not without some reduction which recognizes the risk to 
the injured worker that he might die before the award can be paid. In other words, the same 
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considerations that come into play in a case of total and permanent disability would be engrafted 
to all claims for less than total and permanent disability. 
II 
34. In Martin, the injured worker died from causes unrelated to the work accident 
before evaluation of his disability could be conducted by the Industrial Commission. Construing 
Idaho Code § 72-4 31, the Commission concluded that the reference in the statute to "the income 
benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's death" did not require that the benefits be 
specified by an award made prior to the death of the injured worker. Further, the statute makes it 
clear that the benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's death are payable to the injured 
worker's survivors "whether or not accrued or due at the time of his death". In this context, 
"accrue" means to come into existence as a legally enforceable claim. "Accrue." Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary. http://merriarn-webster.com (11 June 2015). Therefore, Claimant's 
survivors are entitled to the income benefits specified and unpaid at the time of the injured 
worker's death, even though no award had been made and claimant had no legally enforceable 
claim at the time he died. Therefore, the statute anticipates that the award defining Claimant's 
entitlement to disability benefits may be made after the injured worker's death. Defendants 
argue that this construction is at odds with Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 
870 P.2d 1292 (1994), and Brown v. Home Depot, 152 Idaho 605,272 P.3d 577 (2012). 
35. In Brown, the claimant's medical condition stabilized in 2005, but the hearing did 
not occur until 2009. The Commission awarded disability benefits using the 2005 date of 
medical stability. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision. In so doing, the Court 
examined the language of Idaho Code § 72-425, noting a permanent disability rating is a measure 
of a claimant's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity. The Court found 
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"the word 'present' implies that the Commission is to consider the claimant's ability to work as 
of the time evidence is received. There is no present opportunity for the Commission to make its 
decision apart from the time of hearing." Id. at 609, 5 81. 
36. Defendants note that Martin, by necessity, contemplates an evidentiary hearing 
and findings based on a retrospective application. As such, they argue Martin is at odds with 
Davaz and Brown and therefore carries no precedential weight. 
37. In response to this argument, it is first important to note that regardless of what 
might have been said in Brown about the preferred point in time for measuring disability, the 
specific language of Idaho Code § 72-431 anticipates that the Commission is empowered to 
conduct a retrospective evaluation of claimant's disability as though he had he not died from 
causes unrelated to the work accident. Necessarily, this involves the assessment of claimant's 
disability at a point in time removed from the date of hearing. Neither Brown nor Davaz contain 
any language suggesting that a general rule discussed in those cases was intended to impact the 
specific language of Idaho Code§ 72-431. 
38. Second, even if it be assumed that Brown has some application to this case, the 
Brown Court made it clear that the Commission has the latitude to apply Brown in a way that 
avoids injustices or nonsensical results. The specific examples given by the Brown Court were 
not all inclusive. Idaho Code § 72-431 recognizes the survival of both impairment and disability 
less than total. Were the Commission required to measure the injured worker's disability as of 
the date of hearing, no disability would ever be awarded in view of the fact that claimant's death 
was unconnected to the work accident and constitutes a superseding intervening cause primarily 
responsible for the injured worker's inability to work. This nonsensical result could not have 
been contemplated by those who drafted Idaho Code § 72-431. To give meaning to the statute 
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requires of the Commission that it evaluate claimant's disability not as of the date of hearing but 
as of a date just prior to the death of the injured worker. If applicable to this case, we believe 
that Brown affords the Commission sufficient leeway to make this adjustment. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the injured worker. The 
disability of the deceased worker is to be evaluated as of a time immediately preceding 
decedent's death from causes unrelated to the work accident. 
ORDER AND DISSENTING OPINION 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the injured 
worker. 
2. The disability of the deceased worker is to be evaluated as of a time immediately 
preceding decedent's death from causes unrelated to the work accident. 
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Assistant 'E~mm~SI'<>it 'ecretary 
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Commissioner Thomas E. Limbaugh dissenting. 
1. For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision 
concluding that under Idaho Code § 72-431 both impairment and disability less than total survive 
the death of the injured worker from causes other than the work injury. In my opinion, Idaho 
Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment, not disability, and the case of Martin v. Nampa Hwy. 
Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), was decided incorrectly. The very thorough majority opinion 
discusses, and dismisses, the important facts of this issue which ultimately persuade me to 
conclude that Idaho Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment. 
2. It is helpful to take a chronological approach to understanding the development of 
Idaho Code § 72-431 and its application to the issue of whether disability survives the death of 
an injured worker from causes other than the work injury. Prior to 1971, no statute addressed the 
inheritability of impairment or disability after a non-industrial death, but the issue was presented 
to the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. As discussed in the majority, the case law 
regarding this issue, prior to 1971, concludes that in this situation impairment benefits survive 
and disability benefits do not. See Haugse v. Sommers Bros. Mfg. Co., 43 Idaho 450,254 P. 212 
(1927); Mahoney v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 443, 133 P.2d 927 (1943); Peterson v. JR. Simplot 
Co., 83 Idaho 120, 358 P.2d 587 (1961); Martin Estate v. Woods, 94 Idaho 870, 499 P.2d 569 
(1972). These decisions recognize the logic in allowing the inheritance of benefits related to the 
loss of function of a body part (impairment) and not allowing the inheritance of benefits for the 
loss of earning power or capacity to work (disability). The cases stress that disability is a 
replacement for wages, and you do not earn wages after your death. 
3. The next big change in Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law came with the 
recodification in 1971. The new law included Idaho Code § 72-431. While there was no prior 
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Idaho statute detailing which benefits would be inheritable upon a non-industrial death, the Idaho 
Legislature had the prior case law, discussed above, and the Model Code as foundation from 
which it created the new laws. The relevant Model Code was published by the Council of State 
Governments in 1963 in a booklet titled Program of Suggested State Legislation. The influence 
of the Model Code can be seen in many sections of the law, particularly Idaho Code§ 72-431. 
4. The Model Code section which is clearly the base for Idaho Code § 72-431 
addressed only the survival of impairment benefits. It is this Commissioner's view that the 
Model Code was the substantive base for Idaho Code §72-431, and the Model Code was only 
modified to fit Idaho's statute numbering plan which differed greatly from the Model Code's 
numbering. Below is the Model Code with deletions and insertions made to generate Idaho Code 
§ 72-431 as it was passed in 1971 (the list of inheritable dependents is removed from the end of 
the statute for ease of reading). 
When an employee, who has sustained disability compensable as a scheduled or 
unscheduled permanent disability less than total under section (c) , and who has 
filed a valid claim in his lifetime, dies from causes other than the injury or 
occupational disease before the expiration of the compensable period specified, 
the income benefits specified and unpaid at the employee's individual's death, 
whether or not accrued or due at the time of his death, shall be paid, under an 
award made before or after such death, for the period specified in this subsection, 
to and for the benefit of the persons within the classes at the time of death and in 
the proportions and upon the conditions specified in this subsection and in the 
ordered named. 
5. Section (c), stricken above, set forth the schedule of impairment ratings in the 
Model Code, just as Idaho Code § 72-4 28 sets forth Idaho's schedule of impairment ratings. The 
schedules are simply lists of body parts with a specific number assigned to each body part. Idaho 
Code § 72-429 then allows for impairment ratings for other injuries that cannot be classified into 
the schedule to be evaluated relative to the schedule, and uses the term unscheduled permanent 
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disability to describe those ratings. The language "under section ( c )" was stricken and replaced 
with the equivalent portion of the Idaho Code, not by section number but by using the terms 
scheduled or unscheduled disability less than total. 
6. The Model Code, used extensively in Idaho's 1971 recodification, is nearly the 
identical language in Idaho Code § 72-431. It is inherently improbable that the drafters of the 
1971 recodification used the Model Code section regarding survival of impairment benefits, 
changing only a few words but intending it to result in an entirely different section which applied 
to disability instead of impairment. Further, if the intent was to apply to disability it seems that 
the new law would also have included a provision for application to impairment. The 
conspicuous absence of the more utilized section regarding inheritability of impairment again 
supports the conclusion that Section 431 is that section. 
7. The majority concludes that Idaho Code §§ 72-428 and 429 contemplate the 
payment of both impairment and disability in excess of impairment. I do not agree. These 
sections help to create the confusion between the use of the terms impairment and disability, but 
it is a great leap to say that Section 428 applies to disability, as we currently use the term. Idaho 
Code§§ 72-428 and 429 address impairment and, by extension of the same design, Idaho Code§ 
72-431 addresses only impairment also. 
8. Of course, my reading of Idaho Code § 72-431 requires the understanding that the 
distinction between impairment and disability is not consistently applied throughout Title 72. In 
fact, the passage of time has modified the use of the term disability. At the time of the 
recodification the term disability was used in a broad fashion which included what we now term 
impairment. This is evidenced by a review of the entire Model Code, which uses the terms 
disability and income benefits when describing what we now call impairment. In fact, the Model 
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Code's definition of "permanent physical impairment" is found in the last section that focuses 
solely on payment from a second injury fund for an employee who has preexisting "permanent 
physical impairment." Program of Suggested State Legislation by the Council of State 
Governments, p. 164 (1963). The variety of examples set forth in the majority, as well as the 
definition discussed above, establish that while the term disability was historically used to 
include impairment and disability, we currently make a cleaner distinction between impairment 
and disability. 
9. Idaho Code § 72-431 uses the terms scheduled or unscheduled permanent 
disability less than total, in the same way that Section 428 details scheduled impairment ratings 
and in the same way Section 429 explains the proper evaluation of unscheduled impairment 
ratings. Idaho Code § 72-431 applies to scheduled and unscheduled impairment ratings and not 
to disability ratings awarded above the amount of impairment. 
10. The final stop on the development of this issue is the Commission's decision in 
Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988). I agree with the majority the Martin 
decision is on point and compels the conclusion that disability less than total survives the 
claimant's death from other causes. Yet, for the reasons stated above, I disagree with the 
conclusion in Martin and do not support its continued application. 
11. Additionally, I cannot support the effect of the majority's conclusion that 
survivors of a claimant with a high disability rating who dies of unrelated causes will inherit the 
disability benefits, but the survivor's of a claimant who is totally and permanently disabled will 
inherit nothing. This illogical disparity between two classes of survivors cannot be reasonably 
explained. 
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12. It is this Commissioner's belief that the statue was never intended to apply to 
disability. Martin is incorrect and the legislative history, as well as prior case law, stand for the 
proposition that Idaho Code§ 72-431 only applies to impairment. For the foregoing reasons, it is 
my opinion that Idaho Code § 72-431 allowing survivability to benefits, in less than total cases, 
applies only to impairment benefits. I respectfully dissent from the majority decision. 
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COME NOW the Defendants, TPC HOLDINGS, INC. and LIBERTY 
NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP., Surety, by and through their attorney of record, Lea 
L. Kear, and respectfully apply to this Commission for an Order granting expedited appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4. 
BACKGROUND 
The parties submitted the issue for resolution on a stipulation of facts and briefing. 
The matter came under advisement on March 31, 2015. On July 21, 2015, the 
Commission entered its Order in this matter finding that (1) permanent partial disability 
less than total survives the death of the injured worker and (2) the disability of the 
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Keith Mayer, ) I.C. No. 2012-004576 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF 
vs. ) APPEALABILITY 
) 
TPC Holdings, Inc., ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp, ) 
) 
Surety, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
COME NOW the Defendants, TPC HOLDINGS, INC. and LIBERTY 
NORTHWEST INSURANCE CORP., Surety, by and through their attorney of record, Lea 
L. Kear, and respectfully apply to this Commission for an Order granting expedited appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4. 
BACKGROUND 
The parties submitted the issue for resolution on a stipulation of facts and briefing. 
The matter came under advisement on March 31, 2015. On July 21, 2015, the 
Commission entered its Order in this matter finding that (1) permanent partial disability 
less than total survives the death of the injured worker and (2) the disability of the 
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deceased worker is to be evaluated as of a time immediately preceding decedent's death 
from causes unrelated to the work accident. Defendants now request, pursuant to I.AR 
12.4, an Order granting expedited appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
An expedited appeal is appropriate pursuant to the criteria set forth in I.AR. 
12.4(a)(1 ). The Commission has entered an Order determining the compensability of this 
case with respect to entitlement to PPD benefits. Entitlement to PPD is the onlv issue in 
controversy. Allowing Defendants to appeal immediately would prevent needless, 
expensive, and protracted litigation because the issue Defendants wish to bring before the 
Supreme Court is a question of law which has already been decided by the Commission in 
the July 21, 2014 Order. Requiring the parties to develop evidence through hearing would 
not change the legal question to be brought before the Court, thus administrative economy 
would be achieved through an expedited appeal. Additionally, an immediate appeal would 
result in a net reduction of duration, expense, and complexity of litigation if the challenged 
order was reversed because the parties would need to spend time and money to develop 
evidence and proceed to hearing. Moreover, this case raises a novel and important issue 
that will provide helpful guidance to the legal community. Defendants are aware of other 
cases in their own office concerning the same issue, and anticipate that the issue has a 
broad impact within the Idaho Worker's Compensation legal community. 
For the foregoing reasons, an expedited appeal is appropriate under the criteria set 
forth in I.AR. 12.4 
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Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this __ day of July, 2015. 
LAW OFFICES OF KENTW. DAY 
Lea L. Kear 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of July, 2015, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document was served by first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the 
following at the address indicated: 
Michael T. Kessinger 
Goicoechea Law Offices 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
And via fax to 208-743-8140 
Lea L. Kear 
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Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEITH MA YER (DECEASED), 
Claimant, 
vs. 
TPC HOLDINGS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No.: 12-004576 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
DETERMINATION OF 
APPEALABILITY 
COMES NOW the Claimant and responds to Defendants' Motion for Determination of 
Appealability, Claimant is not opposed to Defendants' request for expedited appeal pursuant to 
LA.R. 12.4. 
DATED this )~ day of A'-1 ... ,. ~ 
J 
2015. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
Michael Kessinger 
Attorney for Claimant 
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COMES NOW the Claimant and responds to Defendants' Motion ~r Determination of 
Appealability. Claimant is not opposed to Defendants' request for expedited appeal pursuant to 
I.A.R. 12.4. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I 
correct copy of Claimant's Response to Defendants' Motion for Determination of Appealability 
via facsimile and US Mail upon: 
Lea L. Kear, Esq. 
LAW OFFICES OF KENT W. DAY 
PO Box 6358 
Boise, Idaho 83707-6358 
Fax (800)972-3213 
CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR DETERMINATION OF APPEALABILITY Pg.2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEITH MA YER, 
Claimant, 
V. 
TPC HOLDINGS, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2012-004576 
ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED 
APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4 
F 
On July 31, 2015, Defendants requested an expedited appeal of the Commission's July 
21, 2015 decision in the underlying case pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4. Defendants 
argue that allowing an appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation, 
encourage administrative economy, and resolve a novel and important issue of law. Defendants 
represent that they have several pending cases in which the same issue of law is implicated 
(inheritability of disability benefits), and anticipate that this issue also has a broad impact on the 
workers' compensation community. 
On August 5, 2015, Claimant responded that he was not opposed to Defendants' request 
for an expedited appeal. 
ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 1 
Idaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) 12.4 allows for expedited appeals in Industrial 
Commission Appeals pursuant to Rule 11 ( d)(2), given the following considerations: 
(1) Whether an immediate appeal may prevent needless, expensive, and 
protracted litigation, giving consideration to whether the challenged order would 
be a basis for reversal upon entry of an order resolving all issues regarding a 
claim for benefits. 
(2) Whether irreparable harm or loss will result, the possibility of success on 
appeal is substantially demonstrated, and administrative economy will be 
achieved. 
(3) Whether delay would be unduly prejudicial or cause significant material harm 
to a party. 
( 4) Whether an immediate appeal is like to result in a net reduction in duration, 
expense and complexity of litigation if the challenged order is reversed. 
(5) Whether the order from which appeal is taken raises a novel or important 
issue that will provide helpful guidance to the affected legal community. 
In this case, following review of the historic treatment given to the inheritability of 
disability benefits, the Commission concluded, inter alia, that the current Idaho Code § 72-431 
anticipates that permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the iajured 
worker, while total and permanent disability does not. Commissioner Limbaugh dissented, 
arguing that Idaho Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment, not disability, and the case of 
Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), was decided incorrectly. 
The Commission has reviewed the matter, and finds that I.A.R. 12.4(1), (4), and (5) favor 
an expedited appeal. The issues on appeal are questions of law, the resolution of which would 
prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation, and provide clarity to the parties on how to 
best prepare their case. The inheritability of disability benefits, including the disparate treatment 
of injured workers who are totally and permanently disabled versus profoundly disabled, is a 
perplexing issue of some import, the resolution of which will provide helpful guidance to the 
workers' compensation legal community. The Commission agrees that these matters are 
deserving of immediate review by the Court. 
ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 2 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' request for an expedited appeal under I.A.R. 12.4 is 
hereby GRANTED. 
DATED this __ day of---"'=~"""'-':__' 2015. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of ~~ , 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED PPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4 was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
MICHAEL T KESSINGER 
PO BOX287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
LEAL KEAR 
PO BOX 6358 
BOISE ID 83707-6358 
ka 
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TPC Holdings, Inc., 
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And 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, KEITH MA YER (DECEASED) AND HIS 
A TIORNEY MICHAEL T. KESSINGER, GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, PO BOX 
287, LEWISTON, ID 83501 AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
Pg. 1 - NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1. The above named appellants TPC Holdings, Inc., and Liberty Northwest Insurance 
Corp., appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court 
from the Idaho Industrial Commission's Order entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusion 
of Law, and Order and Dissenting Opinion, entered in the above entitled action filed 
July 21, 2015, Chairman Baskin presiding. 
2. This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.AR. 12.4. On August 11, 2015, the 
Industrial Commission entered an Order Granting Expedited Appeal Under I.AR 
12.4, a copy of which is attached to this Notice. 
3. The question to be presented on appeal is whether the Industrial Commission erred 
in its determination of what compensation benefits survive the death of an injured 
worker. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) No. There is no reporter's transcript because the hearing was through 
stipulated facts. 
(b) Not applicable. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the agency's 
record in addition to those automatically included: 
(a) Stipulated Facts For Hearing filed jointly by the parties; 
(b) Copies of all briefs; and 
(c) Referee Brian Harper's Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and 
Recommendation (not adopted) dated April 1, 2015. 
7. Not applicable, no exhibits were admitted. 
8. I certify that: 
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(a) Not applicable, no transcripts are requested. See 5(a). 
(b) Not applicable, no transcripts are requested. See 5(a). 
(c) The clerk of the Industrial Commission is being paid a fee for preparation of the 
agency's record. 
(d) The Appellant's filing fee is being paid herewith. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this 'Z-/ day of August. 
LAW OFFICE OF KENTW. DAY 
/L--
Lea L. Kear 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the Z-l day of August, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document was served upon the following by first class mail, postage prepaid, 
at the address indicated: 
Michael T. Kessinger 
Goicoechea Law Offices 
PO Box287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S. Clearwater Lane 
Boise, ID 83712 
Lea L. Kear 
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INDUSTRIAL COM.i\-'.IISSION OF 
KEITH MA YER, 
Claimant, 
v. 
TPC HOLDINGS, Il'-JC., 
Employer, 
and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORP., 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
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ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED 
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F E 
On July 31, 2015, Defendants requested an expedited appeal of the Commission's July 
21, 2015 decision in the underlying case pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.4. Defendants 
argue that allowing an appeal will prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation, 
encourage administrative economy, and resolve a novel and important issue of law. Defendants 
represent that they have several pending cases in which the same issue of law is implicated 
(inheritability of disability benefits), and anticipate that this issue also has a broad impact on the 
workers' compensation community. 
On August 5, 2015, Claimant responded that he was not opposed to Defendants' request 
for an expedited appeal. LOO 0065 ~ Boise Legal 
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Retain Original: -,tL YES _ NO 
Idaho Appellate Rule (I.AR.) 12.4 allows for expedited appeals in Industrial 
Commission Appeals pursuant to Rule 11 ( d)(2), given the following considerations: 
(I) Whether an immediate appeal may prevent needless, expensive, and 
protracted litigation, giving consideration to whether the challenged order would 
be a basis for reversal upon entry of an order resolving all issues regarding a 
claim for benefits. 
(2) Whether irreparable harm or loss will result, the possibility of success on 
appeal is substantially demonstrated, and administrative economy will be 
achieved. 
(3) Whether delay would be unduly prejudicial or cause significant materi<J.l harm 
to a party. 
( 4) Whether an immediate appeal is like to result in a net reduction in duration, 
expense and complexity of litigation if the challenged order is reversed. 
(5) Whether the order from which appeal is taken raises a novel or important 
issue that will provide helpful guidance to the affected legal community. 
In this case, following review of the historic treatment given to the inheritability of 
disability benefits, the Commission concluded, inter alia, that the current Idaho Code § 72-431 
anticipates that permanent partial disability less than total survives the death of the injured 
worker, while total and permanent disability does not. Commissioner Limbaugh dissented, 
arguing that Idaho Code § 72-431 applies only to impairment, not disability, and the case of 
Martin v. Nampa Hwy. Dist., 1988 IIC 0367 (1988), was decided incorrectly. 
The Commission has reviewed the matter, and finds that I.AR. 12.4(1), (4), and (5) favor 
an expedited appeal. The issues on appeal are questions of law, the resolution of which would 
prevent needless, expensive and protracted litigation, and provide clarity to the parties on how to 
best prepare their case. The inheritabiiity of disability benefits, including the disparate treatment 
of injured workers who are totally and permanently disabled versus profoundly disabled, is a 
perplexing issue of some import, the resolution of which will provide helpful guidance to the 
workers' compensation legal community. The Commission agrees that these matters are 
deserving of immediate review by the Court. 
ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED APPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4- 2 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants' request for an expedited appeal under I.AR. 12.4 is 
DATEDthis {(thdayof ~ ,2015. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
//)?;n -d 
R.D. Maynard, Chai~ 
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SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jl'~ay of ~ , 2015, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING EXPEDITED PPEAL UNDER I.A.R. 12.4 was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following: 
MICHAEL T KESSINGER 
POBOX287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
LEAL KEAR 
POB0X6358 
BOISE ID 83707-6358 
ka 
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST A TE OF IDAHO 
KEITH MA YER, 
Claimant/Respondent, 
V. 
TPC HOLDINGS, INC., Employer, and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORP., Surety, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Industrial Commission, 
R.D. Maynard, Chairman presiding 
IC 2012-004576 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
and Dissenting Opinion, filed July 21, 2015. 
Lea L. Kear 
PO Box 6358 
Boise, ID 83707-6358 
Michael T. Kessinger 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Defendants/ Appellants - TPC Holdings, Inc., 
Employer, and Liberty Northwest Insurance Corp., 
Surety 
Claimant/Respondent Keith Mayer 
August 21, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR KEITH MAYER- 1 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
$94.00 to Supreme Court and 
$100.00 to Industrial Commission 
Checks were received. 
No hearing was held. The decision was based on a 
Stipulation of Facts 
No transcript was taken. 
August 24, 2015 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR KEITH MA YER - 2 
CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, and 
Dissenting Opinion; Order Granting Expedited Appeal Under I.A.R. 12.4, and the whole 
thereof, in IC case number 2012-004576 for Keith Mayer v. TPC Holdings, Inc., and Liberty 
Northwest Insurance Corp. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 24th day of August, 2014. 
CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL - KEITH MAYER -1 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 43468 on appeal by Rule 28(b )(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ). 
I further certify that all extra documents offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are 
correctly listed in the List of Exhibits. Said documents will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon 
settlement of the Agency's Record herein. 
DATED this day of ' 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - KEITH MAYER 43468-1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
KEITH MA YER, 
Claimant/Respondent, 
V. 
TPC HOLDINGS, INC., Employer, and 
LIBERTY NORTHWEST INSURANCE 
CORP., Surety, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; 
Lea Kear for the Appellants; and 
Michael Kessinger for the Respondent. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Attorney for Appellants: 
LEAL KEAR 
PO BOX 6358 
BOISE ID 83707-6358 
Attorney for Respondent: 
MICHAEL T KESSINGER 
PO BOX 287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - KEITH MA YER 43468 - 1 
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the 
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - KEITH MA YER 43468 - 2 
